Actual competition, potential competition, and bank profitability in rural markets by Gary Whalen
Actual Competition, 
Potential Competition, 
and Bank Profitability 
in Rural Markets 
by Gary  Whalen 
Introduction 
The nature of the relationship between the struc- 
ture of the market in which banks operate-the 
number and size distribution of actual competi- 
tors in a market-and their performance has been 
examined in a considerable number of empirical 
studies over the past 20 years.' Industrial organi- 
zation economists have investigated the structure; 
performance relationship for a wide variet).  of 
intra- and interindustn samples of firms. 
The typical maintained hypothesis has been 
that explicit or tacit collusion is more likely in 
markets with a limited number of large competi- 
tors and should result in a statistically significant 
positive relationship between market concentra- 
tion and the profitability of firms operating in  the 
market. Definitive support for this h)pothesis 
implies that an activist antitrust policy aimed at 
limiting merger-related increases in concentra- 
tion is an appropriate public policy goal. 
A positive concentration/ profits relationship 
has been found in some, but far from all, of the 
empirical studies investigating bank market 
structure and performance. The mixed results of 
this body of empirical work have been inter- 
preted in widely different ways. 
1  Fw revlews of  th~s  wwk. see  Wades (1982). Gilkn  (1984). and 
Osbwne and Wendel (1983). 
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Some researchers, predisposed to accept the 
reasonableness of the concentrationicollusion 
hypothesis, have concluded that the weight of 
the evidence supports this position and have 
advanced a number of reasons to discount the 
lack of consistent empirical support for the 
expected relationship between concentration 
and bank profitability.? One is that the equations 
estimated in many of these studies have been 
misspecified, possibly biasing the estimated 
coefficient on the concentration variable. In par- 
ticular, several researchers have suggested that 
market concentration might impact bank man- 
agement's risk-return preferences or opportuni- 
ties.'  Specifically, bank management operating 
in concentrated markets might trade off potential 
monopoly profits for lower risk. If  this is the 
case, significant concentration-related differences 
in profitability might not be evident in studies 
that fail to explicitly control for risk. 
Other researchers have argued that the single- 
equation estimation techniques typically used in 
previous empirical work, even those where risk 
measures have been included as additional 
2  Th~s  a the  conclusion of Fihoades (1982). 
8 3  See  Heggestad (1977). FUmdes and Rutz (1982). Clark (1986b). and 
L~aq  (1987). 
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results.4  In  their view, profitability and risk are 
determined simultaneously, so  we should rely 
only on the results of studies where the relation- 
ships berween these variables and concentration 
are investigated using simultaneous equation 
estimation techniques. 
Yet another group of researchers argue that the 
concentration/collusion hypothesis is unreason- 
able because it embodies a questionable implicit 
assumption: that technological conditions, regu 
lation. other barriers to entry, or the threat of 
predation allow colluding firms in concentrated 
markets to disregard potential competitors. 
Concentration-related monopoly power and 
profits can exist and persist only when there is 
no threat of entry by potential  competitor^.^  Mar- 
kets in which this type of behavior can occur 
have been given the label "noncontestable." In 
theoretical work, researchers have shown that 
when entry and exit are not precluded, or a mar- 
ket is contestable, then outcomes can approxi- 
mate those of perfect competition even if the 
number of actual competitors is quite small or if 
concentration is high.6  Consequently, firm prof- 
itability should not be expected to vaty with 
concentration. 
The possibility that potential competitors may 
significantly affect the prices charged and profits 
earned by incumbent firms has been recognized 
for some time.'  Until quite recently, however, 
banks and other financial intermediaries faced 
numerous regulator). and legislative constraints 
on geographic location, on permissible products 
and sewices they could offer, as well as on the 
prices they could charge. Thus, fen, of the geo- 
graphic and product markets in which banks 
operated approximated the contestable ideal. 
This situation has changed dramatically in the 
past 10 years. A large number of states have 
reduced intrastate and, more recently, interstate 
8 4  Thrs is the conclusion of  Clark (1986b) and  L~ang  (1987) 
8 5  See  Bmzen (19821 and BaumoI. Panzar, and Will~g  (19821 
barriers to geographic expansion b!.  commercial 
banks and b!.  savings and loan institutions. In 
addition, the repeal of usw  laws and removal of 
Regulation Q ceilings on deposit rates have leh 
financial intermediaries basically free to compete 
on a price basis. 
Empirical investigations of scale and scope 
economies in banking suggest that small-scale 
entn is not precluded by cost conditions.8 A 
negligible amount of the costs of branching 
appears to be  sunk. These circumstances suggest 
that banking markets-at least in states that have 
liberalized branching to some extent, facilitating 
entry by out-of-market firms-have become 
contestable. Alternatively, potential competition 
may have become an effective disciplinan force, 
which could explain the absence of a strong 
positive concentration:profitability relationship 
in some of the more recent empirical st~dies.~ 
Researchers who do  not subscribe to the con- 
centrationicollusion hypothesis have offered an 
alternative explanation for the significant posi- 
tive relationship between concentration and 
profmbility reported in some previous studies. 
They argue that such a finding need not neces- 
sarily signal collusion or indicate causation run- 
ning from concentration to profitability. In their 
view, labeled the "efficient structure hypothe- 
sis" (ESH), superior efficiency, management, or 
luck could result in increased firm profitability 
and market share and, ultimately, in higher con- 
centration.I0 If the ESH is correct, then the posi- 
tive relationship between concentration and 
profitability detected in empirical work where a 
market share variable is not included is spurious 
and simply reflects the correlation between 
market share and concentration. 
At present, then, there continues to be a great 
deal of uncertainty and disagreement about the 
relationship berween market concentration, 
potential competition, and bank performance. 
Ven feur of the numerous previous studies have 
incorporated risk, controlled for market share, 
and investigated possible simultaneity. 
More important, virtually no  empirical work 
on the impact of potential competition in bank- 
ing, or in any other industry for that matter, has 
m 6  Actually  researchers  have ditferenlialed markets accwdlng lo the 
degree  to  which they are  contestable  At  one extreme are  noncontestable 
markets  At  the other extreme are  penectly contestable markets  In essence 
perfectly contestable rnarkets are ones ~n  which entry and exit are  COStleSS 
Thrs.  in turn  rmplres no  bamers of  any ~ind  lo entry and  ex11 In pamcular.  8 8  See  Berger. Hanweck, and Humphrey (1986) 
zero  sunk costs are requrred to enter the market  Markets in whlch entv and 
em!  can occur but  are not costless have been labeled imperfectly contestable  8 9  For  example. Evamfl and Forl~er  (1988) find ev~dem  of a positwe 
In such markets  potentla1  compet~tlm  IS  expected to  influem  the  perfor-  mcentrat~onlproficab~ly  relat~onsh~p  for a subsample of banks drawn from 
mance 01 ~ncumbenl  llrrns  For a me  detailed discussion of tk%  ~ssues,  see  un11  banking states but not  for  the subsample drawn from stales vhere 
Schwanz  (1986). pp  37-48. and Mmn  and  Wlnston (1987). M, 53-60  branching rs pernutted 
8 7  Thrs  possib~llty  was noted ~n  Barn  (1949) more than 30 years ago.  8 10  See  Smirlock (1985). 
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make banking an ideal subject for such research. 
The partial, gradual elimination of geographic 
barriers to market entry, cost conditions, and the 
local nature of banking markets mean that entry 
can occur if  market conditions warrant and that 
the number of potential bank entrants for each 
local market can be determined. 
This paper attempts to provide more defini- 
tive evidence on the relationship berween com- 
petition and bank profitability. The relationship 
berween bank profitability and both actual and 
potential competition is examined in a frame- 
work that explicitly includes market share and 
risk variables. Further, the impact of possible 
simultaneity is also explored. 
The sample consists of 159 banks dram  from 
non-MSA (metropolitan statistical area  counties 
in Ohio. The focus is on non-LISA counties for 
several reasons. First, the number of actual bank 
competitors in a qpical non-MSA county is gen- 
erally small, and concentration is high relative 
to MSAs in the state. Second, economic and demo- 
graphic characteristics of rural counties generally 
make them less attractive for entry than urban 
counties. Finally. actual and potential competj- 
tion from out-of-market  and nonbank suppliers 
of financial senrices  is likely to be limited. 
Thus. if  the concentrationicollusion h~pothe- 
sis is correct and if potential competition is a rel- 
athyely  unimportant  determinant  of firm  perfor- 
mance, supporting empirical evidence is likely to 
be obtained from this data set. Conversel>..  ab- 
sence of support for the concentrationr collusion 
hypothesis and the finding that potential com- 
petition impacts bank performance in rural 
markets is strong evidence that local banking 
markets. both rural and urban, are contestable. 
The time internal examined is from 19'9  to 
198 1. This particular period was chosen because 
the bank branching law in Ohio was liberalized 
in Januan 1979. Before then, de novo branching 
was limited to a bank's home office county. 
Under the new law, banks could branch de novo 
into all counties contiguous to the county in 
8  11  The  only emhc11  emplncal lesl lo dale  IS  Hannan  r 19791  In many 
struclure~perfomnce  sludles. !he  slgn and slar~sl~cal  slgn~f~cance  01 coefil- 
clenls on  Manchlng law  dumm~es  In esllmaled pol~labll~tv  equarlons are used 
to draw Inferences about  the  lntenslty of  polenl~al  cofnpellllcm  In others, the 
stat~st~cal  s~golflcance  (or  lack of  s~gnlbcance)  of the esllmaled coefflc~ent  on 
lhe concenrrallcm tern s used  lo oblarn lnslghr cn thls ~ssue  In facl, very few 
explic~l  emDlr~cal  lests of  c~ntestab~l~ly/polenl~al  competltlon have been dm 
lor any  ~ndustry,  ~ncluo~ng  the  alrllne lndUStry  wnlcn Baumol  el al  clled as an 
example of  one  w~tn  mleslabie markets  The  sludy by Mamm and W~nslon 
(19871 may  be the only one publ~shed  lo date 
which their head office was located. Thus, the 
partial removal of geographic restrictions on 
bmnching created an identifiable number of po. 
tential bank entrants for each county in the state. 
The choice of a three-year time period appears 
somewhat arbitrary, However. a period of this 
length should be short enough to ensure that 
ongoing expansion activin. by banks does not 
materially affect the measure of potential corn- 
petition used in the study. It should also be 
long enough to allow any performance impacts 
attributable to potential competition to be 
detected statistically. 
In the following sections, we discuss the 
model to be estimated, describe the sample and 
estimation techniques. and present the results. -4 
summav  and conclusions follow. 
I.  Model Specification 
Unfortunately, there continues to be no  strong 
consensus about the "best" microeconomic 
model of the banking firm. As a result, 
researchers disagree about how the profitability 
equation to be estimated-whether a single 
reduced-form equation or a structural equation 
in a simultaneous system-should be specified. 
No attempt is made here to resol\.e the theoreti- 
cal debate. Our approach is simply to estimate 
versions used in previous studies, with market 
share, risk. and potential competition variables 
explicitly included. 
Thus, the profitabilin equations estimated had 
the following general form: 
( 1 )  PROF, =  f ( AC,  . PCi, '\ISi,  RISK, , _Zi) 
where 
PROF,: a measure of  the profitabilit).  of 
bank  i 
AC,: a proxy for actual competition in 
the market in which bank  i 
operates 
PC,: a proxy for potential competition 
faced by bank i 
,!IS,:  the market share of bank i 
RISK,:  a measure of the overall risk of 
bank i 
2,  : a vector of additional control  - 
variables 
The profitability measure employed as the 
dependent variable in this study is rate of return 
on equity (net income after taxes, excluding se- 
curities gains and losses, divided by book equity, 
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three years from 1079 to 1981. This profitabilin 
measure best reflects the efforts of managers 
interested in shareholder wealth maximization. 
The determinants of profitability of primary 
interest in this study are actual and potential 
competition. The former is proxied in two 
alternative ways: by incumbent-firm market 
concentration and by the number of actual 
competitors. The latter is proxied only by the 
number of potential competitors.I2 
The precise form of the relationship between 
the proxies for actual competition, potential 
competition, and profitabilit).  are unclear and 
could take a number of different forms. 
The consensus view is that actual competition 
will be more intense and incumbent profitabil- 
ity nrill be lower, the greater the number of 
actual competitors or the lower the market con- 
centration. The relationship between these 
proxies, the likelihood of collusion, and the 
intensiy of cornperition and ultimately profita- 
bilin might not be linear, however.l"or 
example, the 'marginal impact.of additional. 
actual competitors might not be constant, but 
could decline as the number of competitors 
increased. As a result, we also investigate non- 
linear relationships between the proxies for 
actual competition and profitability. 
As long as entry into rural banking markets is 
not precluded, the prices and profits of incum- 
bents should also van systematically with the 
number of potential entrants. However, there is 
some uncertaine about the precise form of the 
relationship benveen incumbent profitabilin and 
the numbrr of potential competitors because 
the relationship bemeen the number of potential 
competitors and the intensic of potential com- 
petition is unclear.I4 The standard view appears 
to be that the larger the number of potential 
entrants, the greater the perceived threat of entn 
and the lower the incumbent prices and profits. 
Some m~iters.  however. have suggested that 
when more than one potential entrant exists. 
each potential entrant will recognize that entn 
by others could occur and could impact its 
8  12  Slnce 11 1s  not  clear  that  the  size  d~slrlbulm  of potential competitors 
lnlluences lhelr penormance ImDact. and  slnce cwlstructlon 01  a measure of 
pOtentra1 comDetltor concentratlwl would oe  extremely ledlous, only the 
numoer of  potentla1  competitors IS employed 
1  13  The possbllly of a nonilnear relat~onshlp  oetween measures of 
market structure and perlorrnance 1s  noted ~n  Heggestad (1979). pp  468-69. 
8 14  For  a dlscusslon of  the eqxcted relatlonhp between concentration. 
potentla1 compelltlon, and ~ncwnoent  protltab~l~ty,  see  Call and Keler !1%6). 
D  221:  Schwanz (1986). pp. 47-48; and  Mon~son  and Winston (1987). 
expected profit.Is Researchers have demon- 
strated that mutual awareness among potentlal 
entrants could cause the relationship bemeen 
the number of potential entrants and the overall 
likelihood of entry to be non-monotonic, per- 
haps even negative. This type of relationship 
implies that the negative marginal impact of 
additional potential competitors on incumbent 
profitabiliy could decline as the number of 
potential entrants increases. Because of th~s 
possibility. a quadratic potential competition 
specification is also explored. 
Several researchers have also suggested that 
the impact of potential competition could van 
with the intensity of actual market competition, 
and possibly with the two measures of market 
structure employed here to proxy this force.16  In 
particular, a given number of potential competi- 
tors could impose a larger impact on incumbent 
profitability if actual competition in the market 
were less intense. To investigate this possibilit)., 
actual competition/potential competition inter- 
action variables are included in several versions 
of the performance equations estimated. 
Our study uses two summary measures of 
incumbent market structure: the three-firm 
deposit concentration ratio and the number of 
actual competitors. Two variants of each of 
these measures are employed. One is calculated 
using data for commercial banks only. The other 
is calculated using data for both banks and sav- 
ings and loans, in recognition of the typically 
considerable thrift share of deposits in counties 
throughout Ohio and their expanding ability to 
compete with commercial banks. 
The number of holding company organiza- 
tions legally permitted to branch de novo into 
each market is the measure of potential compe- 
titlon employed in this analysis. Available data 
revealed that holding company affiliates were 
responsible for most of the de novo branching 
activit) in Ohio from 1979 to 1981. We exclude 
smaller banks that are unlikely to branch de 
novo in order to produce a more precise meas- 
ure of potential competition.I7 
8  15  See  Kal~sh.  Hartzog. and  Cass~dy  11978)  Emp~rlcal  evldence support- 
~ng  this view appears In Hannan (1981) and  Marlson and Wlnston (1987) 
1  16  Poss~ble  lnreract~ms  between measures of actual and potential m. 
petitrm are discussed m  Hannan (1979). pp  442-43. and m Momson and  Win- 
ston (1987). p. 63. 
1  17  Exam~nallffl  of data on  branching In Ohlo over the  1979  to 1981 
perlod revealed that hold~ng  company afllllates established 61 percent  of  the 
total number of  Ce novo branches over thls rntewal Further, they established 
64 percent of  those opened In cont~guous  cwntles. See  Whalen (1981). 
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centration variable, market share for each bank 
is defined in  mo  different ways: by its share of 
commercial bank deposits in  the market and by 
its share of bank and savings and loan deposits 
in the market. An  insignificant coefficient on the 
incumbent market structure variable, in con- 
junction with a positi\.e, significant coefficient 
on the related market share term, is evidence 
supporting the efficient structure hypothesis. 
The risk measure used in this study is the same 
one used by a number of previous researchers: 
the standard de~~iation  of return on equity over 
the period examined (  1979 to 1981 ).  There is 
some disagreement about the nature of the rela- 
tionship between this variable and profitability 
Heggestad ( 1979)  and Clark ( 1986b) have argued 
that the relationship should be positive: Liang 
( 1987 ) has suggested that it should be negative.I8 
There is empirical evidence in support of both 
positions. Because of the uncertainn and 
because the precise nature of the relationship 
between these two variables is not the primar). 
focus of this paper, the anticipated sign of the 
coefficient on the risk measure is left ambiguous. 
The other explanaton variables in the esti- 
mated profitability equations are elements of 
the vector, _Z. These are presumably exogenous 
variables that reflect differences in the character- 
istics of an individual bank, or economic condi- 
tions in its market or its regulaton environment 
that could influence its profitabilin. 
Three bank characteristic variables are 
employed: a bank size measure, a dummy vari- 
able measure of the number of branches oper- 
ated. and a dummy variable indicating whether 
the bank was a subsidian of a bank holding 
company. Economic conditions in  each bank's 
local market are represented by wo variables: 
average per capita personal income and per cap- 
ita personal income gron-th. Finally, n7e  use a 
Federal Resen'e System membership dummy to 
control for regulation-related cost differentials. 
To determine if  the estimated relationship 
bemeen actual competition, potential competi- 
tion, and profitabilin is materially influenced by 
the neglect of possible simultanein. the profita- 
bilin equation is also viewed as a structural 
equation in a multi-equation simultaneous qs- 
tem. Specifically, a noequation system similar 
to that used in Liang  ( 1987) is employed. In this 
8 18  In  L~ang's  model, greater  prof11  varrabllrty rmplres greater expected 
costs and assoc~ated  penaltres to the bank, resulting ~n  a negatrve relatronshrp 
between prolrt vanabrl~ty  and ewted  profrl margms. 
system. bank risk is the other endogenous rarl. 
able. The main difference bemeen her specifi- 
cation and the one employed here is the adJi. 
tion of the potential competition term. 
Liang's structural equation for risk contains fi1.t. 
predetermined variables that do  not appear in 
the profitability equation discussed above. 
These variables are designed to prox?  market 
uncertainn. They are the standard deviation of 
market per capita personal income. unesplained 
market deposit supply, unexplained variation in 
bank i's loan demand, unexplained variation in 
bank i's deposit supply, and the conriance of 
bank i's unexplained loan demand and deposit 
supply. The precise definition of each of these 
variables and the reduced-form equations for 
this model are detailed in the appendis. 
II.  Sample and 
Methodology 
Our sample consists of the 159 single-market 
banks headquartered in non-MSA Ohio counties 
at the end of 1981. Single-market banks are those 
with all ofices located within their home ofice 
counn. This criterion allows their performance to 
be related to the characteristics of their particular 
local markets. The presumption is that non-hlS.4 
counties approximate local rural banking markets. 
The profitabilin equations are estimated using 
tn-o different statistical techniques. Ordinary leas 
squares regression (OLS) is used to estimate ver- 
sions in which risk is viewed as exogenous. 
Two-stage least squares (ISLS) is the technique 
used to estimate the profitabiliy equation when 
it is viewed as part of a simultaneous system. 
Ill. Results 
Regression results are presented in tables 1 and 
2. Only the equations containing measures of 
actual market structure and market share calcu- 
lated using commercial bank data are included 
in  the tables. The results were essentially the 
same when savings and loans were considered 
in the calculation of these variables and there- 
fore are not reported. 
Table 1 contains versions of the profitability 
equation estimated using OIS; table 1  contains 
abbreviated results obtained by estimating ver- 
sions of the equations in table 1 ~~iewed  as part 
of a two-equation simultaneous model. The esti- 
mation technique is 2SL5. Only the coefficients 
and t-statistics for the actual competition, poten- 
tial competition, market share, and risk variables 
are reported. In general, the overall explanatory 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
1988 Q 3
Best available copy(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variables  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
SIZE  -0.74  1219  -0.791260  -0.734965  -0.83-16-+4 
(-1)  (6  -6  (-1.68) 
HCPE  -0.1585'3  -1.219721  -0.15688'  -0.80624' 
( -1.29)  ( -7.34)  (-1.38)  ( -2.i6) 
HCPESQ  0.11i109 
(2.10) 
RsQ  0.34  0.35  0.34  0.36 
NOTE: T.sratistics  are In parentheses. 
SOZ'RCE: Author. 
power of the estimated equations is good, given 
the size and cross-sectional nature of the sample. 
The coeficients on the actual and potential 
competition and market share variables are of 
primary interest. The signs and statistical signifi- 
cance of the other variables in the estimated 
equations are of secondary imponance here and 
will not be discussed. 
The coefficient on the concentntion v~riable 
is never even marginally significant in any ver- 
sion of  the equation estimated.'"  The results 
were invariant to specification and estimation 
techniques. Including savings and loans in  the 
calculation of this variable and excluding the 
market share term did not alter this finding. 
When the number of actual competitors is 
used as the actual competition proxy, the resulrs 
obtained do  vary with the specification employed. 
The coefficient on the number of actual competi- 
tors term is insignificant when a linear specifica- 
tion is employed andwhen  an  actual competition: 
potential competition interaction term is not 
included in the estimated equation. However. 
when an interaction term is included. the coeffi- 
cient on the number of actual competitors varia- 
ble becomes negative and significant. This result 
holds =.hen savings and loans are included in 
this measure and when a simultaneous-equations 
estimation technique is employed. The coefi- 
cients are not significant when a quadratic ver- 
sion is examined. 
.  The estimated coefficient on the number of 
potential competitors variable is negative, but 
only marginally significant (that is, 10 percent 
level, one-tail test) when a linear specification is 
employed and when an actual competitionipo- 
tential competition interaction term is not 
included. However, when this variable is used in 
an estimated equation in conjunction with the 
number of  actual competitors and an interaction 
term, the coefficient is negative and significant. 
In  these equations, the actual competition/' 
potential competition interaction term, con- 
structed by multiplying the number of actual and 
pcxential competitors, exhibits a positive signifi- 
cant coefficient. This finding supports the view 
that the negative marginal impact of additional 
actual competitors declines as the number of 
potential competitors increases. Similarly, the 
larger the number of actual competitors in a 
market, the smaller the negative marginal impact 
of additional potential competitors. 
When a quadratic potential competition speci- 
fication is employed, the estimated coefficients 
on the number of potential competitors term 
and the square of this variable are both signifi- 
cant. The pattern of signs (negative and positive, 
respectively) could reflect mutual awareness 
among potential entrants. This result suggests 
that the marginal impact of additional potential 
competitors is initially negative. 
8 19  A  Hed~ndahl-H~rschmnn  Index of mamet concenlrallwl was also 
employed ~n  place of  t'w  three-frrm cmcenlratrm ratlo. The change In the 
deflnltlon of  the  cmcenrrat~on  ratro d~d  not MTerially Impact the results. 
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declines as the number of potential competitors 
increases and finally turns positi\.e. The magni- 
tudes of the coefficients imply that incumbent 
firm profitability is constrained in  markets with 
five or fewer potential entrants. This finding 
supports the notion of a nonlinear relationship 
bernreen the number of potential entrants and 
the overall probability of entn. 
Changing the definition of the market struc- 
ture and market share variables to include sa\,- 
ings and loans did not alter either the size or the 
statistical significance of the coefficients on the 
potential competition variables in any of the 
specifications examined. Further, a comparison 
of each equation in table 1 with its counterpart 
in table 3 also demonstrates that the sign and 
statistical significance of the coefficients on the 
variables of interest in the estimated equations 
are not sensitive to the estimation technique 
used.20 This was true for the other exogenous 
control nriables as well. 
(1  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variables  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
CBO  -0.001519  -0.0108'0 
( -0.08)  (-0.53) 
IVCBO  0.00'936  -0.530 134 
(0.05)  (-1.-9) 
.IISBO  0.036002  0.041391  0.03583  1  0.035165 
(  1.52)  (  19 (  1.43)  (  1.43) 
SD%E  -O.85"'3  -0.810309  -0.8-030-7  -0.803'04 
( -3.95 )  (-1.78)  ( -3.00)  (-3.80) 
HCPE  -0.159169  -  1.8685 -0.158830  -0.8010i3 
(-1.38)  -2.  (-1.30)  (-3.46) 
HCPESQ  0.1  10i31 
( 1.93) 
HCMBO  0.111721 
( 2.13) 
F  1.80  -7.33  1.81  1.1  1 
RSQ  0.1 1  0.li  0.11  0.14 
NOTE: T-srat~stics  are In parentheses. 
SOL'RCE:  Author. - 
In general. the coefficient on the market share 
nriable is positive and at least marginally s~gnifi- 
cant (at the 10 percent level. one-tail test) in 
every variant of the profitability equation esti- 
mated. As  with the concentration measure. 
somewhat stronger results are obtained when 
savings and loan deposits are considered in the 
construction of this variable. 
IV.  Summary and 
Conclusions 
The results support the notion that non-AlSA bank- 
ing markets are contestable. That is, we found 
bank performance to be systematically related to 
proxies designed to measure the intensity of 
actual and potential competition. The threat of 
entry by potential competitors does appear to 
limit incumbent firm profitability,  although the 
threat of entr?.  and the number of potential 
competitors may not be monotonically related. 
Incorporating risk into the analysis and consider- 
ing possible simultaneity bemeen risk and prof- 
itability did not materially alter the results. 
Both proxies for actual competition were not 
found to be consistently related to bank perfor- 
mance, however. The concentration measure 
was not found to be significantly related to the 
profitability of banks operating in rural markets 
in Ohio in any specification investigated. Only 
the number of competitors proxy was found to 
be significantly related to bank profitability in 
the expected way. 
The finding that potential con~petition  has a 
significant impact on incumbent performance is 
somewhat surprising for several reasons. First, 
potential competition is generally expected to be 
a weak force in  rural banking markets. Second, 
researchers have argued that potential entrants 
may not significantly impact incumbent prices 
and profits in periods immediately after a change 
in regulations that affects entn  conditions. The 
intern1 anal>zed  was just such a peritd. In addi- 
tion, the potential entrant mriable used in this 
study does not include potential nonbank com- 
petitors, particularly savings and loans. Thus, the 
variable is obviously not a perfect proxy for the 
threat of entn in the markets examined. 
Further research on the impact of potential 
competition in  banking markets appears war- 
ranted to determine if  the obsemed relationships 
20  In add~t~on  to further examlne the sensltlvlty ol the results to 
cnanges In spec~flcallon  verslons of  the prof~tablllty  equatlm slm~lar  to the one 
appearing In the four-eqwtm mdel develooed In Clark  11986b) were also 
est~mated  The  only change In Clark's speclllcatlon was the  addll~on  of  the 
potentla1 cornpetltlon measures used In thls study  Agaln  thls change In  spec^. 
I~catlon  dld not materially alter Ine results reported above 
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Best available copyare e\.ident for other samples of banks and in 
other time peritds. Ho~e\~er,  the results of this 
stud!  suggesr that it is unclear whether the con- 
solidation taking place in banking in recent years 
has substantially lessened competition, given the 
simultaneous reductions in barriers to market 
entn  that have occurred. 
For bank regulaton agencies, the results also 
imply that the competitive impacts of bank 
AROE:  Bank  z 's annual after-tax return on equity, 
averaged over the 1979- 1981 period. 
CBO: Three-firm market concentration ratio, banks 
only, June 1980. 
NCBO:  Number of banks operating in the market 
of bank  i,  June 1980. 
HCPE: Number of holding company organizations 
legally permitted to branch de novo into the market. 
HCPSQ: The square of HCPE. 
HC--:  Interaction term. HCPE times xarious 
alternatii-e measures of market structure. 
.IISBO:  Bank j's deposit marker share, banks only. 
June 1980. 
SDROE: Bank i 's standard deviation of annual 
after-tax return on equity over the 19'9-1981  period. 
SIZE:  Log of  total assets of bank  i. 
OD:  Dummy variable equal to one if bank i has 
at least one branch. othemise equal to zero. 
FRlJ:  Dummy variable equal to one if bank i uras 
a member of the Federal Reserve System, othem7ise 
equal to zero. 
.11BHC:  Dummy \xiable equal to one if bank i is 
a holding cornpan!.  subsidian, othemise equal to 
zero. 
mergers cannot be reliably determined solely 
from a mechanical analysis of  changes in  actul 
market structure. Entn conditions and the exis- 
tence of potential competition should also be 
considered and used to temper conclusions 
drawn from an analysis of merger-related 
changes in concentration or in the number of 
actual competitors. 
PCPI:  Per capita personal income in the market 
averaged over the 1979- 1981 interval. 
PCPGR: Per capita personal income growh in the 
market over the 1979-1981 interval. 
SDPCPI: The standard deviation of market per cap- 
ita personal income over the 1979-1981  interval. 
12.1DU: Market deposit uncertainty variable equal to 
proportion of unexplained variation in market depos- 
its derived from the regression of market deposits on 
market income over the 1979-1981 interval. 
WSK: Loan  uncertainty variable for bank i equal 
to proportion of unexplained variation in total loans 
derived from the regression of total loans on market 
income over the 1979-1981  interval. 
DRISK:  Deposit uncertainty variable for bank 
i equal to proportion of unexplained variation in 
total transactions deposits derived from the regres- 
sion of total transactions deposits on market income 
over the 19?9-  1981 interval. 
COIZD: Covariance of unexplained loans and de- 
posits for bank i over the 1979-1981  period. 
A 
SDROE: Predicted value for SDROE derived from 
the following first-stage regression with the relevant 
actual and potential competition variable(s) added: 
A 
SDROE = f  (,IISBO, SIZE, OD, FRII, AIBHC, PCP4 
PCPIGR, SDPCPI, ,tlDL( WSK,  DRISK, COVLD). 
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